Introduction
Euthanasia is one of the most debated topics in the world today. While most of us accept the claim that humans have the right to life and the right to self-determination, the problem of Euthanasia gives way to the ethical dilemma of having to choose one right over the other. Those in favor of voluntary Euthanasia claim that human beings have the right to self-determination, and from this it follows that given the case where living (or rather the process of dying) becomes unbearable, it is morally justified to hasten one’s death. Those against it argue for the sanctity of life, and that it is never right to terminate the life of another person.
This essay will argue for the moral justification of voluntary Euthanasia. As such, a person suffering from a painful and terminal disease may be right in deciding to hasten his death if he finds his suffering unbearable. This critical assessment will draw from the thoughts of Glanville Williams concerning the justification of voluntary Euthanasia, and will attempt to resolve objections to his position as presented by Yale Kamisar.
Against the Slippery-Slope Argument
The complexity of human living obliges the reflective thinker to think beyond generalizations and to consider particularities. For this reason, it is not the case that every claim for Euthanasia is morally justified. Both Kamisar and Williams, while reaching opposite conclusions, both advance their positions regarding voluntary Euthanasia and not in regards to the form that would allow for the mercy killing of the insane or those advanced in age. However, while Williams argues that voluntary and involuntary Euthanasia cannot be argued for on the same grounds, Kamisar believes that allowing the former would provide precedence for the latter. This, I believe, is an untenable position.
First, we must consider the fact that involuntary Euthanasia does not meet the condition of the proposed right of self-determination. On the other hand, we are not warranted to terminate persons who, despite their disabilities, do not consent to an act that deliberately ends their lives. The fact that some people (i.e. idiots, the elderly) may be a nuisance for us is not enough to terminate their lives anymore than killing a young and sane individual who happens to annoy many people. There are alternatives. For example, we can place restrictions on what they can and cannot do (i.e. prohibiting the insane from operating vehicles). Thus, we can arguably make the case that the act of killing someone only because he may be a burden to society is at par with murder. This cannot be compared with the case of a person who suffers from a terminal disease, and feels that he can no longer deal with the pain.
A second objection to the slippery-slope (or “wedge”) argument is that there are cases that go against the assumption that permitting one form of action will result in the gradual acceptance of more extreme measures of the same kind. Williams compares the possible acceptance of voluntary Euthanasia with the issue of sterilization. Many were concerned that permitting voluntary sterilization would lead to “a large-scale violation of human rights”, yet this was not the case in America. In fact, the acceptance of voluntary sterilization in America had an opposite effect from what the critics expected. This also comes to show that Kamisar’s wedge argument cannot be supported.
While one cannot make the claim that everyone suffering from a terminal disease expresses the desire to die, we must nevertheless account for those who do. Those who suffer, seek treatment but still want to die must be considered. In such cases, we must not only consider their wish, but also that which gives rise to this desire. Upon their request for mercy killing, there is the option of probing further into the possible causes of their grief (i.e. physical pain, psychological effects of their disease, reasonable arguments presented to them). However, if the patient still wants to hasten his death, we ought to respect his decision, even if we disagree. The patient, unlike anyone around him, has immediate access (viz. his own personal experience) to the kind of pain he is enduring. Thus, not even a physician’s diagnosis can determine the meaning of the patient’s life, or the moral value of keeping him alive against his own wishes.
Contrary to this position, Kamisar holds that patients are often incapable of making a responsible decision, despite the fact that they voluntarily express the desire of hastening their death. He argues that those who are drugged are incapable of making authentic choices. Moreover, Kamisar suggests that a patient “with a clear mind” still lacks this capacity given the effects of his pain. Based on these presumptions, Kamisar believes that a terminally ill patient is almost never in a position to make an irrevocable decision, such as one that results in his own death.
Although we cannot ignore Kamisar’s caution concerning the irrevocability of decisions that involve mercy killing, it does not follow that the patient is completely oblivious to what he is going through. As Williams explains, Kamisar creates a false dilemma, since “there are cases where one can be sure of the patient’s consent.” Therefore, even though we cannot conclude that patients always make responsible decisions, there are at least those who can and do regarding their own lives.
The Patient’s Decision: His Rights
Does this alone suggest that terminally ill patients who no longer wish to live ought to die? From what has been argued, this is not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, it is also helpful to consider the fact that the right to life has its limitations. We are all bound to die at one point or another. This is to say that when we make claims regarding the right to life, we are not supposing that we will life forever, but only expressing the reasonable wish to live a dignified life. Defined this way, it follows that the conflict between the rights to life and self-determination is resolved.
While doctors and relatives may do their best to help the patient live a dignified life, they cannot make him live forever and must understand when it is time to let go. Therefore, while doctors and relatives may be willing to commit themselves to the task of caring for the patient while he is still alive, they should also, by that same measure of compassion, respect his wishes. By this, I do not mean to undermine the value of the patient’s life, but only to affirm his right to decide that the severity of his illness has rendered his life undignified.
From this critical assessment, it follows that the right to die is not incompatible with the basic human desire for a dignified life, or the right to self-determination. While Kamisar presents important challenges to those who uncritically accept the Pro-Euthanasia side of the debate, his claims concerning the patient’s capacity to make an authentic choice are inconclusive. Moreover, the “wedge” argument he presents is not enough to convince his critics that allowing voluntary Euthanasia will lead to abuses. As Williams aptly demonstrates, historical facts have falsified similar claims, as in the case of voluntary sterilization in America.Therefore, while mercy killing may not be morally justified in every possible case, there are nevertheless good reasons to believe that a patient’s voluntary decision to hasten his own death ought to be respected when he can no longer endure his suffering.
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Light and peace to all whose eyes these letters appear!
